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Why Motive Matters: Designing Effective Policy Responses 
to Modern Debtors’ Prisons 
Andrea Marsh* and Emily Gerrick** 
Introduction 
 
The protests in Ferguson, Missouri that followed the shooting death of un-
armed Black teenager Michael Brown by a White police officer triggered na-
tional scrutiny of the city’s justice system. The ensuing media coverage,1 along 
with a comprehensive white paper by the ArchCity Defenders2 and a scathing 
civil rights report by the U.S. Department of Justice,3 uncovered a modern-day 
debtors’ prison, the existence of which helped fuel the community response to 
Brown’s death and widespread distrust of law enforcement officials.4 
Recent attention to how jurisdictions such as Ferguson impose and seek to 
collect fines and costs for minor offenses has raised public awareness of a truth 
long known to many criminal justice advocates: courts across the country rou-
*  Andrea Marsh is a Clinical Lecturer and the Director of the Richard and Ginni 
Mithoff Pro Bono Program at The University of Texas School of Law. She founded 
and serves as Senior Counsel at the Texas Fair Defense Project. 
**  Emily Gerrick is a Staff Attorney at the Texas Fair Defense Project and a 2014 
Arthur Liman Public Interest Fellow. 
 1. See, e.g., Radley Balko, How Municipalities in St. Louis County, Mo., Profit from 
Poverty, WASH. POST: THE WATCH (Sept. 3, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost 
.com/news/the-watch/wp/2014/09/03/how-st-louis-county-missouri-profits-from-
poverty/.  
 2. THOMAS HARVEY ET AL., ARCHCITY DEFENDERS, ARCHCITY DEFENDERS: MUNICIPAL 
COURTS WHITE PAPER (Nov. 23, 2014), http://www.archcitydefenders.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/11/ArchCity-Defenders-Municipal-Courts-Whitepaper.pdf 
[hereinafter ArchCity White Paper]. 
 3. U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE 
DEPARTMENT (Mar. 4, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-
releases/attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson_police_department_report.pdf 
[hereinafter DOJ Ferguson Report]. 
 4. See, e.g., id. at 79-80 (finding that distrust between Ferguson’s Black community 
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tinely jail low-income people who cannot pay in full fines and costs stemming 
from criminal cases.5 Most people would agree that debtors’ prisons such as 
these are immoral, and the U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly condemned 
many of the practices that produce them.6 Why then do these practices persist? 
So far, our national conversation about modern debtors’ prisons has placed 
the blame for their existence almost exclusively on municipalities’ interest in 
maximizing the revenue generated by their courts on the backs of disenfran-
chised communities.7 Revenue generation is a relatively straightforward and 
easy-to-grasp explanation for what is otherwise confounding, widespread ille-
gality on the part of law enforcement and court officials. This focus on revenue 
generation has led to policy responses premised on the notion that modern 
debtors’ prisons can be eliminated if the revenue-generation motive is disrupted 
or controlled. 
While acknowledging revenue generation as one strong motive for the 
practices that produce modern debtors’ prisons, this Essay argues that it is an 
incomplete explanation. Incarceration for debt is fiscally irrational in most in-
dividual cases, because governments are effectively doubling their losses by add-
ing incarceration and other enforcement costs to accumulated criminal justice 
debts that can never be collected. The limitations of the revenue-generation 
motive suggest other factors play a role in sustaining modern debtors’ prisons 
and merit greater attention than they have received. 
Part I of this Essay briefly discusses common components of criminal jus-
tice debt and constitutional limitations on incarceration for criminal justice 
debt. It then gives a national overview of practices that produce modern debt-
ors’ prisons. In Part II, we analyze the strengths and weaknesses of revenue gen-
eration as the driving explanation for modern debtors’ prisons and propose ad-
ditional motivations that may contribute to their existence. Part III argues that 
all motives must be considered if we are to design effective policies to end mod-
ern debtors’ prisons, and considers the policy implications of a more complex 




 5. Although this Essay focuses on how Ferguson and local governments across the 
country jail individuals for fines and costs arising from minor offenses, we 
recognize that incarceration for debt also is common in more serious criminal 
cases, particularly when an individual is on probation or parole. The 
constitutional limitations on incarceration for debt apply to all of these scenarios, 
see infra Part I.A.2, and most of our analysis is applicable to nonpayment of fines 
and costs in more serious cases.  
 6. See infra Part I.A.1. 
 7. See infra Parts II.A-B. In Ferguson, the city’s Black community was particularly 
impacted. See infra note 156, and accompanying text. Debtors’ prisons directly 
impact low-income communities consisting of people who do not have resources 
to pay criminal fines and fees as well. 
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I. Legal Framework and Overview of Modern Debtors’ Prisons 
 
 A. Legal Framework 
 
1. Legal Financial Obligations Arising From Criminal Cases: Fines 
and Costs 
 
Debts arising from criminal offenses usually break down into two basic cat-
egories: fines and costs. A fine is the prescribed punishment for the offense.8 
Costs are “user-fees” that are legally permissible when they reimburse the gov-
ernment for expenses incurred in prosecuting a person.9 
Although proponents of costs justify them by claiming they make “crimi-
nals . . . pick up part of the tab” for the justice system,10 costs often are used as 
general revenue available for any public purpose, or as dedicated revenue for 
specific purposes unrelated to the justice system. The municipal code of Joplin, 
Missouri, for example, states that all costs shall be “paid into the city treasury 
for the use and benefit of the city.”11 In Texas, money collected from the consol-
idated court cost, which is supposed to fund only judicial functions, instead is 
remitted in large part to the state general revenue fund or to unrelated dedicat-
ed revenue funds, such as the “Rehabilitative Services for Texans with Disabili-
ties Fund.”12 
The costs arising from an offense frequently end up totaling more than the 
fine for the offense and, despite the fact that they are theoretically non-punitive 
in nature,13 often are converted into jail sentences in the same way as fines. For 
 8. See, e.g., Gipson v. State, 428 S.W.3d 107, 110 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (stating that 
fines are “characteristically different” from court costs because they are assessed in 
order to punish the defendant). 
 9. See, e.g., Weir v. State, 278 S.W.3d 364, 366 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (clarifying that 
court costs are “nonpunitive ‘recoupment[s] of the costs of judicial resources 
expended in connection with the trial of the case’”) (citation omitted)); Strattman 
v. Studt, 253 N.E.2d 749, 754 (Ohio 1969) (“As we view it, statutory provisions for 
payment of court costs were not enacted to serve a punitive, retributive, or 
rehabilitative purpose, as are fines.”). 
 10. James Pinkerton, Harris County Has Access to Millions in Discretionary Funds, 
HOUSTON CHRON. (June 9, 2012), http://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/ 
article/Harris-County-has-access-to-millions-in-3622279.php. 
 11. JOPLIN, MO., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 9.03 (“All costs, fines and forfeitures imposed 
by the municipal court, or collected under authority thereof, and all other receipts 
so collected, shall be regularly accounted for and paid into the city treasury for the 
use and benefit of the city.”). 
 12. Brief of Amicus Curiae Tex. Fair Def. Project in Support of Appellant Orlando 
Salinas at 3-4, Salinas v. State, 369 S.W.3d 176 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) (No. PD-
0419-14). 
 13. See, e.g., Weir, 278 S.W.3d at 366. 
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example, a traffic offense in California with a base fine of $100 can end up cost-
ing a total of $470 with the addition of costs such as a $40 security fee to defray 
court security expenditures and a $10 license fee to defray the costs of recording 
and maintaining records of vehicle violations.14 In Austin, Texas, the base fine 
for driving five miles over the speed limit is $41.90,15 with costs bringing the to-
tal amount due up to $145. Even if an individual pays the portion of the total 
that corresponds to the fine, under Texas statute she still may be committed to 
jail if she fails to pay the balance that is allocable to the costs assessment.16 
 
2. Constitutional Limitations on Incarceration for Nonpayment of 
Criminal Fines and Costs 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court repeatedly has held that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment constrains governments from incarcerating an individual for failure to 
pay a criminal fine or cost if the person is unable to pay.17 In Williams v. Illinois, 
the Court ruled that involuntary nonpayment of a fine or cost cannot justify 
imprisoning a person beyond the maximum period authorized by statute.18 
Soon thereafter, the Court held, in the case of a traffic offense punishable only 
by a fine, that upon nonpayment, it is unconstitutional to convert a fine into a 
prison term if the defendant is indigent and without the means to pay.19 Most 
recently, the Court held in Bearden v. Georgia that states cannot automatically 
revoke probation for nonpayment of a fine or cost, without consideration of a 
person’s ability to pay.20 
 14. Where the Money Goes, SUPERIOR CT. OF CAL., CTY. OF KERN 2, https://www.kern 
.courts.ca.gov/pdf/where_money_goes.pdf (last visited Feb. 16, 2016). 
 15. Tyler Whitson & Joy Diaz, Why Your Speeding Ticket Doesn’t Pay for What You 
Think It Does, KUT (Apr. 22, 2015), http://kut.org/post/why-your-speeding-ticket-
doesn-t-pay-what-you-think-it-does.  
 16. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 45.046(a) (allowing commitment for failure to pay 
both fines and costs). 
 17. See Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 664-66 (1983); Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 
398-99 (1971); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 240-41 (1970). The Court decided 
Tate and Williams under the Equal Protection Clause. See Tate, 401 U.S. at 399; 
Williams, 399 U.S. at 244. More recently, the Bearden Court discussed how due 
process and equal protection principles converge in this line of cases and suggested 
that a due process approach was more appropriate for confronting the role an 
individual’s relative poverty should play in the assessment and enforcement of a 
criminal sentence. See Bearden, 461 U.S. at 665, 666 n.8. The Court has rejected 
poverty as a suspect classification in civil cases decided subsequent to Williams and 
Tate. See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 323 (1980) (citations omitted). 
 18. Williams, 399 U.S. at 241-42. 
 19. Tate, 401 U.S. at 399. 
 20. Bearden, 461 U.S. at 672. In addition to these limitations, the Fourteenth 
Amendment also requires the State to afford individuals with criminal debt the 
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While these three cases commonly are understood as prohibiting debtors’ 
prisons, they do not create an absolute bar to incarcerating individuals for non-
payment of criminal fines and costs. The Court consistently has limited its rul-
ings in this area to cases of involuntary nonpayment, and has disclaimed any 
intent to prevent the incarceration of individuals who willfully refuse to pay a 
fine or cost.21 The limitations on the constitutional protections afforded to 
criminal court debtors are stated most explicitly in Bearden. In that case, the 
Court reiterated that an individual cannot be automatically incarcerated for 
nonpayment, and that instead a court first must inquire into the reasons the in-
dividual has failed to pay.22 However, when conducting that inquiry, a court 
may consider not only whether a person presently is able to pay, but also 
whether the person has made “sufficient bona fide efforts legally to acquire the 
resources to pay.”23 If a person does not make these “sufficient bona fide ef-
forts,” she may be deemed “responsible for” or “at fault” for the nonpayment, 
and thus may be lawfully incarcerated for voluntary nonpayment even if there is 
no question that the person does not possess the funds required to pay the fine 
or cost.24 
The Bearden Court also recognized that the State has a fundamental interest 
in punishing individuals who violate its criminal laws even if those individuals 
are, in the Court’s framework, truly, involuntarily poor.25 Because of that inter-
est, a court may imprison an individual even for involuntary nonpayment if al-
ternative measures—such as payment plans, community service, and fine re-
ductions—are not adequate to meet the State’s interests in punishment and de-
deterrence.26 The determination that alternative measures are not adequate 
cannot be made at the legislative level, however, but instead must be based on 
individualized, case-specific facts.27 The Court’s reasoning in Bearden suggests 




same protections that are afforded to civil judgment debtors, at least when the 
debt is enforced through a civil judgment process. James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128, 
139-40 (1972).  
 21. Tate, 401 U.S. at 400; Williams, 399 U.S. at 242 n.19.  
 22. Bearden, 461 U.S. at 672. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. at 665, 668. 
 25. Id. at 699 (“A defendant’s poverty in no way immunizes him from punishment.”). 
 26. Id. at 672.  
 27. Id. 
 28. Id.; see Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 399-401 (1971); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 
244-45 (1970).  
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B. Modern Debtors’ Prisons in Ferguson and Beyond 
 
Although some advocates,29 academics,30 and journalists31 had focused their 
attention on the prevalence and consequences of criminal justice debt before 
2014, there is little question that the public protests that followed Michael 
Brown’s death in Ferguson in August of that year put a national spotlight on the 
existence of modern debtors’ prisons. Ferguson triggered much broader societal 
awareness of this phenomenon, and has played a large role in shaping public 
understanding of how modern debtors’ prisons operate. 
Investigations that sought to illuminate the causes and scope of community 
resentment and unrest in Ferguson revealed that a largely White police force 
issued numerous minor citations to the city’s majority Black residents.32 Cita-
tions carried steep costs that would grow quickly over time if an individual did 
not pay promptly—such that a single ticket with a $151 fine could balloon to a 
debt of more than $1,000.33 The Ferguson municipal court automatically issued 
arrest warrants for debtors who missed court appearances or payments on their 
tickets, in the latter situation without any consideration of whether an individ-
ual had an ability to pay.34 In 2013 alone, the city issued arrest warrants for more 
 29. See, e.g., ALICIA BANNON ET AL., BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
DEBT: A BARRIER TO REENTRY (2010), http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/ 
files/legacy/Fees%20and%20Fines%20FINAL.pdf; ROOPAL PATEL & MEGHNA PHILIP, 
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE DEBT: A TOOLKIT FOR ACTION 12-13 
(2012), http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/publications/ 
Criminal%20Justice%20Debt%20Background%20for%20web.pdf. 
 30. See, e.g., Helen A. Anderson, Penalizing Poverty: Making Criminal Defendants Pay 
for Their Court-Appointed Counsel Through Recoupment and Contribution, 42 U. 
MICH. J.L. REFORM 323, 335-39 (2009); Ann Cammett, Shadow Citizens: Felony 
Disenfranchisement and the Criminalization of Debt, 117 PA. ST. L. REV. 349, 381-84 
(2012). 
 31. See, e.g., Eric Dexheimer, Hard-up Defendants Pay as State Siphons Court Fees for 
Unrelated Uses, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN (Mar. 3, 2012), http://www.statesman 
.com/news/news/special-reports/hard-up-defendants-pay-as-state-siphons-court 
-fe-1/nRkxj/; Brian Rogers, Hit with a DWI, Many Pick Jail over Probation, 
HOUSTON CHRON. (Sept. 24, 2006), http://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/ 
article/Hit-with-a-DWI-many-pick-jail-over-probation-1856857.php. 
 32. Ferguson, a city of approximately 21,000 residents, DOJ Ferguson Report, supra 
note 3, at 6, issued approximately 90,000 citations and summonses for municipal 
violations over a four-year period beginning in July 2010, id. at 7. “Ferguson’s law 
enforcement practices overwhelmingly impact African-Americans.” Id. at 4. While 
over half of Ferguson’s population is Black, only four of its fifty-four sworn police 
officers are Black. Id. at 6-7. 
 33. See id. at 4. 
 34. Class Action Complaint at 4, Fant v. City of Ferguson, 107 F. Supp. 3d 1016 (E.D. 
Mo. Feb. 8, 2015) (No. 4:15-cv-00253) [hereinafter Ferguson Complaint]. 
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than forty percent of its residents.35 Once arrested, debtors were “instructed to 
call everybody [they] could think of who might have money to pay [the] fine—
with the promise of three or four days in jail if [they] could not find somebody 
with enough money.”36 In one six-month period, 256 people, ninety-six percent 
of whom were Black, could not come up with the money and were jailed.37 Col-
lections from residents who did manage to pay their municipal fines and costs 
provided Ferguson with twelve percent of its general revenue in 2011.38 
In the wake of Ferguson, a steady stream of news stories,39 advocacy re-
ports,40 and lawsuits41 has documented that the practice of jailing low-income 
debtors who cannot afford to pay criminal fines and costs is both a regional and 
nationwide problem that affects low-income communities well beyond Fergu-
son. Ferguson is one of ninety municipalities in St. Louis County, many of 
which have limited tax bases and are highly dependent on their municipal 
courts for revenue.42 Like Ferguson, many of these municipalities issue very 
large numbers of citations relative to their population size43 and routinely exe-
cute arrest warrants for nonpayment.44 Ferguson is only one of several St. Louis 
County municipalities that have been sued for operating debtors’ prisons.45 
 35. See DOJ Ferguson Report, supra note 3, at 6, 55 (noting that the population of 
Ferguson is roughly 21,000 people and stating that arrest warrants were issued 
against 9,007 people in fiscal year 2013). 
 36. ArchCity White Paper, supra note 2, at 16.  
 37. DOJ Ferguson Report, supra note 3, at 56. 
 38. See id. at 9. The fact that these individuals did pay does not mean that all of them 
possessed the money to do so. Arrested individuals were encouraged to seek funds 
from third parties in order to make payments and avoid incarceration. See supra 
text accompanying note 36. 
 39. E.g., Balko, supra note 1. 
 40. E.g., ARCHCITY DEFENDERS, IT’S NOT JUST FERGUSON: MISSOURI SUPREME COURT 
SHOULD CONSOLIDATE THE MUNICIPAL COURT SYSTEM (2015) http://www 
.archcitydefenders.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/Its-Not-Just-Ferguson-
Consolidate-the-Municipal-Courts.pdf [hereinafter It’s Not Just Ferguson]. 
 41. E.g., Class Action Complaint, Jenkins v. City of Jennings, No. 4:15-cv-00252 (E.D. 
Mo. Feb. 8, 2015) [hereinafter Jennings Complaint]. 
 42. Twenty-one of the ninety municipalities in St. Louis County derive twenty percent 
or more of their general budget from municipal fines and fees. BETTER TOGETHER, 
PUBLIC SAFETY - MUNICIPAL COURTS 2 (Oct. 2014), http://www.bettertogetherstl 
.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/BT-Municipal-Courts-Report-Full-Report1 
.pdf. Fines and fees represent the largest source of revenue in fourteen 
municipalities. Id. at 7. 
 43. It’s Not Just Ferguson, supra note 40, at 31-32, 38. 
 44. Id. at 16. 
 45. Jennings Complaint, supra note 41; see also Civil Rights Class Action Complaint at 
7-8, Whitner v. City of Pagedale, No. 4:15-cv-01655 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 4, 2015) 
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High-profile civil rights claims also have been filed against jurisdictions in 
the South that operate debtors’ prisons in collaboration with private probation 
companies that contract with the jurisdictions to handle collections. The proba-
tion companies typically offer their services to municipalities at no charge, in 
exchange for the right to collect probation fees from the individuals they super-
vise, many of whom are on probation solely because they need time to pay their 
fees and costs.46 For example, the Southern Center for Human Rights filed a 
lawsuit in April 2015 against Red Hills Community Probation and two Georgia 
municipalities that contracted with Red Hills.47 The municipalities would place 
indigent defendants on probation with Red Hills if they could not afford to pay 
their fines immediately and in full.48 One disabled, indigent plaintiff received a 
ticket for burning leaves in his yard without a permit, and was ordered to pay a 
$500 fine, spend twelve months on probation, and pay Red Hills $44 per month 
in fees. When he failed to pay, he was arrested and jailed until a friend brought 
$250 to buy his release.49 Similar litigation challenging practices that produce 
debtors’ prisons has been commenced in other private probation jurisdictions, 
including Alabama,50 Georgia,51 Mississippi,52 and Tennessee.53 
Beyond Missouri and private probation jurisdictions, news reports and liti-
gation have identified low-income debtors who have been incarcerated for 
nonpayment of criminal fines and fees in states as diverse as Colorado,54 Louisi-
(alleging arrest warrants are issued against individuals who cannot pay fines for 
municipal violations in Pagedale). 
 46. Profiting from Probation: America’s “Offender-Funded” Probation Industry, HUMAN 
RIGHTS WATCH 2-3 (2014), https://www.hrw.org/report/2014/02/05/profiting-
probation/americas-offender-funded-probation-industry [hereinafter Profiting 
from Probation]. 
 47. See Complaint, Edwards v. Red Hill Cmty. Prob. LLC, No. 1:15-cv-00067 (M.D. 
Ga. Apr. 10, 2015).  
 48. Id. at 22-24. 
 49. Id. at 22-23.  
 50. E.g., Complaint, Reynolds v. Judicial Corr. Servs. Inc., No. 2:15-cv-00161 (M.D. 
Ala. Oct. 21, 2015).  
 51. E.g., Complaint, Thompson v. DeKalb Cty., No. 1:15-mi-99999-UNA (N.D. Ga. 
Jan. 29, 2015) [hereinafter DeKalb Complaint]. 
 52. E.g., Class Action Complaint, Kennedy v. City of Biloxi, No. 1:15-cv-00348 (S.D. 
Miss. Oct. 21, 2015) [hereinafter Biloxi Complaint].  
 53. E.g., Rodriguez v. Providence Cmty. Corr., Inc., No. 3:15-cv-01048 (M.D. Tenn. 
Oct. 1, 2015). 
 54. See, e.g., Letter from Mark Silverstein, Legal Dir., Am. Civil Liberties Union of 
Colo. & Rebecca Wallace, Staff Att’y, Am. Civil Liberties Union of Colo., to 
Wynetta Massey, City Att’y, Colo. Springs (Sept. 14 2015), http://static.aclu-co 
.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/2015-09-14-Massey-ACLU2.pdf; see also Press 
Release, Am. Civil Liberties Union of Colo., Colorado Springs Sentences 
Hundreds of Impoverished People to Debtors’ Prison in Violation of U.S. 
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ana,55 Michigan,56 Ohio,57 Washington,58 and our own state of Texas.59 For ex-
ample, in October 2015 the Texas Fair Defense Project (TFDP) filed a class ac-
tion lawsuit against the City of Austin in which the court had ordered the lead 
plaintiff to either pay thousands of dollars or perform hundreds of hours of 
community service for unpaid tickets.60 Because she was a single mother of five 
disabled children living below the poverty line, she could not hope to comply 
with the court’s demands and eventually was arrested and ordered to spend for-
ty-five days in jail.61 In the twelve months leading up to the lawsuit, the city 
jailed about 900 other debtors.62 As in Ferguson, people of color were dispro-
portionately affected by debtors’ prison practices, with Black residents being 
over six times as likely to be jailed as White residents.63 
While Ferguson and private probation have provided the dominant narra-
tives of modern-day debtors’ prisons, observed conditions in Texas and other 
jurisdictions can help identify common practices that produce debtors’ prisons 
even in the absence of local idiosyncrasies such as private probation and St. 
Louis County’s municipal fragmentation: 
Constitution and State Law (Oct. 22, 2015), http://aclu-co.org/colorado-springs 
-sentences-hundreds-of-impoverished-people-to-debtors-prison-in-violation-of 
-u-s-constitution-and-state-law/. 
 55. See, e.g., Campbell Robertson, Suit Alleges ‘Scheme’ in Criminal Costs Borne by New 
Orleans’s Poor, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 17, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/18/ 
us/suit-alleges-scheme-in-criminal-costs-borne-by-new-orleanss-poor.html. 
 56. See, e.g., Joseph Shapiro, Supreme Court Ruling Not Enough To Prevent Debtors 
Prisons, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Jan. 8, 2015), http://www.npr.org/2014/05/21/ 
313118629/supreme-court-ruling-not-enough-to-prevent-debtors-prisons. 
 57. See, e.g., AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF OHIO, THE OUTSKIRTS OF HOPE: HOW 
OHIO’S DEBTORS’ PRISONS ARE RUINING LIVES AND COSTING COMMUNITIES (Apr. 
2013), http://www.acluohio.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/ 
TheOutskirtsOfHope2013_04.pdf. 
 58. Shapiro, supra note 56. 
 59. Alex Campbell & Kendall Taggart, Lawsuit Claims Austin Illegally Jails Poor People, 
BUZZFEED (Oct. 27, 2015), http://www.buzzfeed.com/alexcampbell/austin-illegally-
jails-poor-people-lawsuit-claims; Kendall Taggart & Alex Campbell, Their Crime: 
Being Poor. Their Sentence: Jail., BUZZFEED (Oct. 7. 2015), http://www 
.buzzfeed.com/kendalltaggart/in-texas-its-a-crime-to-be-poor.  
 60. Class Action Complaint, Gonzales v. City of Austin, No. 1:15-cv-00956 (W.D. Tex. 
Oct. 27, 2015) [hereinafter Austin Complaint].  
 61. Id. at 5. 
 62. Email Attachment from John Walker, Admin. Specialist, Austin Mun. Court, to 
author (Dec. 15, 2015) (on file with author). 
 63. Data from Open Records Requests to Austin Municipal Court for month of July. 
TFDP requested all commitment orders and all associated tickets, which for the 
most part indicate race. This estimate assumes that the debtors with the surnames 
Montemayor and Hernandez are Hispanic. 
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Failure to consider an individual’s ability to pay. Although Bearden and re-
lated cases prohibit courts from automatically converting debt into jail time and 
require courts to inquire into the reasons for an individual’s nonpayment,64 
courts across the country disregard these constitutional requirements. Through 
the City of Austin lawsuit, TFDP discovered that municipal judges rarely, if ev-
er, ask about ability to pay before jailing people for nonpayment. In Bastrop, 
Texas65 and Biloxi, Mississippi,66 debtors have been jailed immediately after ar-
rest without even seeing a judge, let alone having an ability-to-pay hearing. 
Subjective judicial determinations that objectively low-income individuals are 
guilty of voluntary nonpayment. Judges who do conduct ability-to-pay determi-
nations often make findings that an individual is able to pay based on subjective 
and arguably inappropriate criteria, and as a result do not offer alternatives to 
payment before ordering the individual jailed. For example, a judge in Mont-
gomery, Alabama, found that one debtor whose sole income consisted of social 
security payments that were legally exempt from criminal fines nevertheless was 
guilty of voluntary nonpayment because he regularly gave money to his 
church.67 Another judge in Benton County, Washington, told reporters that he 
made his findings about debtors’ ability to pay based on physical appearances. 
When debtors come before him with expensive-looking clothing or tattoos, the 
judge finds they are able to pay without considering any other available evi-
dence about their income.68 Similarly, a municipal judge in Austin, Texas re-
jects debtors’ claims of indigence if they have manicured nails.69 
Requirements that individuals “sit out” their fines and costs. When a court 
automatically issues a warrant without considering ability to pay, or determines 
that nonpayment is voluntary after a hearing, courts often require debtors to 
pay their fines and costs immediately or “sit out” their debts in jail. Although in 
some places debtors who are incarcerated for nonpayment can end up owing 
more money due to the imposition of jail fees,70 in many jurisdictions debtors 
 64. See supra text accompanying notes 19-22. 
 65. TFDP visited two detainees who were jailed by the City of Bastrop for several days, 
neither of whom saw a judge prior to incarceration. 
 66. Biloxi Complaint, supra note 52, at 15. 
 67. Brian Lyman, Federal Judge Blocks Collection of Fines from Indigent, MONTGOMERY 
ADVERTISER (May 1, 2014), http://www.montgomeryadvertiser.com/story/news/ 
local/2014/05/01/federal-judge-blocks-collection-of-fines-from-indigent-in 
-montgomery/8563643/.  
 68. See Shapiro, supra note 56. 
 69. Court observation notes from Aug. 26, 2015 (on file with authors). Another TFDP 
client who had been living in his car was told he did not qualify for community 
service because he could not “prove” he was homeless.  
 70. For example, the city of Jennings in Missouri adds extra jail fees onto old debts 
while debtors are incarcerated for nonpayment. Jennings Complaint, supra note 
41, at 8-9. 
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pay their fines and costs with “jail credit” awarded at a specified rate. In Mont-
gomery, Alabama, for example, criminal debtors earn $50 to $75 in jail credit 
toward unpaid court debt per day, depending on whether or not the debtor 
works while incarcerated.71 In Texas, the jail credit rate usually is $50 to $100 a 
day and “pay or stay” practices are so common that municipal and justice 
courts resolved more than 700,000 cases at least in part through jail credit in 
2013.72 Some Texas courts appear to “collect” more debt in jail credit than in ac-
tual money.73 
Limited or nonexistent alternatives to payment. Although Bearden and other 
cases require courts to offer indigent criminal debtors alternatives to full pay-
ment,74 in practice these alternatives are not available or are very difficult to ac-
cess in many jurisdictions. Many cities, including Ferguson, Missouri, do not 
offer community service as an alternative to payment.75 The city of Biloxi, Mis-
sissippi explicitly states that fines are due in full the same day they are assessed, 
and that release on a payment plan is a privilege rather than a right.76 
In Texas, some courts require detailed applications and documentation be-
fore debtors may enter into a payment plan,77 requirements that may make it 
difficult or impossible for non-citizens to qualify. Other courts condition the 
 71. First Amended Class Action Complaint at 1-2, Mitchell v. City of Montgomery, 
No. 2:14-cv-00186 (M.D. Ala. May 23, 2014) [hereinafter Montgomery Complaint]. 
 72. Texas Office of Court Admin. data (on file with authors). 
 73. Texas Office of Court Admin. studies on court collections in Houston and Waco 
(on file with authors). 
 74. Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 672 (1983) (“Only if the sentencing court 
determines that alternatives to imprisonment are not adequate in a particular 
situation to meet the State’s interest in punishment and deterrence may the State 
imprison a probationer who has made sufficient bona fide efforts to pay.”). 
 75. See DOJ Ferguson Report, supra note 3, at 54 (noting only juveniles eligible for 
community service in lieu of payment). In Montgomery, Alabama, community 
service was not available as an alternative to payment prior to 2014, see 
Montgomery Complaint, supra note 71, at 2, and only became available in 
response to civil rights litigation, see Press Release, S. Poverty Law Ctr., SPLC 
Lawsuit Closes Debtors’ Prison in Alabama Capital (Aug. 25, 2014), 
http://www.splcenter.org/news/2014/08/26/splc-lawsuit-closes-debtors%E2%80 
%99-prison-alabama-capital. 
 76. Biloxi Complaint, supra note 52, at 4. 
 77. See, e.g., Time Payment Plans, CITY OF BURLESON, TEX., https://burlesontx.com/ 
555/Time-Payment-Plans (last visited Feb. 16, 2016) (allowing only state-issued 
drivers licenses and identification cards); Judge Wayne L. Mack, Payment Plan 
Application & Financial Statement Form, MONTGOMERY CTY., TEX., http://www 
.mctx.org/courts/justices_of_the_peace/justice_of_the_peace_pct_1/docs/Online_
Payment_Plan_Docs.pdf (last visited Feb. 16, 2016) (allowing state-issued drivers 
licenses and identification cards, school identification cards, and birth certificates). 
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availability of payment plans on a large down payment,78 shutting out many 
low-income debtors. A number of courts do not offer community service op-
tions to some or all adult debtors.79 And although waivers of fines and costs are 
statutorily authorized when a low-income debtor cannot afford to pay or com-
plete community service without undue hardship,80 in practice courts rarely 
grant these waivers. For example, in 2013, Houston granted indigence waivers in 
only ten cases, while jailing people for nonpayment in 71,692 cases.81 
 
II. Explaining the Persistence of Debtors’ Prisons 
 
A. Why We Care About Why 
 
In our current public conversation about the prevalence and consequences 
of criminal justice debt and modern debtors’ prisons, the topic soon turns to 
motive. More than a hundred years after prohibitions on imprisonment for 
debt were incorporated into almost every state constitution,82 why is the threat 
of incarceration for failure to pay criminal fines and fees seemingly ubiquitous? 
More than thirty years after the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that ability to pay 
must be considered before someone can be confined for nonpayment,83 why do 
 78. See, e.g., Court & Detention Services, CITY OF DALLAS, http://dallascityhall.com/ 
departments/courtdetentionservices/pages/payment-plan.aspx (last visited Feb. 16, 
2016) (requiring a thirty percent down payment); Time Payment Plans, supra note 
77 (noting that people applying for payment plans must “[p]ay $125 or 20%, 
whichever is greater, for the initial payment at the time of request”).  
 79. See, e.g., Taggart & Campbell, supra note 59 (no community service offered in El 
Paso); Community Service, CITY OF BURLESON, TEX., https://burlesontx.com/1436/ 
Community-Service (last visited Feb. 16, 2016) (offering community service only 
to juveniles in Burleson). Even when Texas jurisdictions do offer payment plans 
and community service, criminal debtors may have difficulty obtaining 
information about these options before they face a warrant and arrest. See, e.g., 
Press Release, San Antonio, City Offers Opportunities for Payment Before 
Warrant Roundup (Feb. 20, 2015), https://www.sanantonio.gov/Pre-
K4SanAntonio/pressrelease/TabId/936/ArtMID/2752/ArticleID/2845/City-offers-
opportunities-for-payment-before-Warrant-Roundup.aspx (implying that 
payment is the only option to clear arrest warrants).  
 80. TEX CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 45.046, 45.049. 
 81. 2013 data from the Texas Office of Court Admin. (on file with author). 
 82. Christopher Hampson, The New American Debtors’ Prisons 20, 23 (Aug. 15, 2015) 
(unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
2639709. Although most of these constitutional provisions narrowly apply to 
contractual debt, and thus not to criminal justice debt, they were adopted in an 
environment that rejected incarceration for debt as overly punitive and 
insufficiently modern. Id. at 26-27.  
 83. See supra Part I.A.2. 
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so many courts jail criminal justice debtors without first examining whether the 
individual before them is able to pay the owed economic sanction? 
One motive has been endorsed almost unanimously as the dominant ex-
planation for what drives courts to assess and collect economic sanctions with-
out regard for individual rights: revenue generation.84 
Revenue generation is both obvious and powerful as a proffered motive for 
why courts impose and enforce monetary penalties in criminal cases in a man-
ner that produces debtors’ prisons—after all, we are talking about judges col-
lecting money that funds their own courts’ operations, in whole or in part,85 
and that in many instances contributes additional revenue to the local govern-
ments that employ them.86 Revenue generation provides such a compelling ac-
count of why modern debtors’ prisons exist that many of its proponents cate-
gorically reject suggestions that other traditional justifications for the 
imposition and enforcement of economic sanctions for minor offenses contrib-
ute to, and complicate, the problem.87  
The focus on the motive of revenue generation also has dominated the pol-
icy response to debtors’ prisons in the Ferguson era. Many efforts to end the 
imprisonment of poor people for unpaid criminal justice debt have targeted lo-
cal governments’ incentives and ability to raise revenue through the courts. In 
 84. See, e.g., ArchCity White Paper, supra note 2, at 4-5; BETTER TOGETHER, supra note 
42, at 1; DOJ Ferguson Report, supra note 3, at 42; Profiting from Probation, supra 
note 46; Balko, supra note 1; Jeremy Kohler et al., Municipal Courts Are Well-Oiled 
Money Machine, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Mar. 15, 2015), http://www.stltoday 
.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/municipal-courts-are-well-oiled-money  
-machine/article_2f45bafb-6e0d-5e9e-8fe1-0ab9a794fcdc.html; Sophie Quinton, 
After Ferguson, States Struggle to Limit Crippling Court Debt, GOVERNING (Aug. 26, 
2015), http://www.governing.com/topics/finance/sl-ferguson-court-debt-states 
.html; see also Brief for LaMarcus Pruiett as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Respondent at 25, Mo. Municipal League v. Missouri, 465 S.W.3d 904 (Mo. Mar. 
18, 2015) (No. SC94493) [hereinafter MML Amicus Brief]; Jennings Complaint, 
supra note 41, at 36; DeKalb Complaint, supra note 51, at 1.  
 85. See, e.g., ArchCity White Paper, supra note 2, at 33 (noting that judges’ status as 
municipal employee creates incentive for them to collect enough fines to cover 
their own and their peers’ salaries). 
 86. See, e.g., BETTER TOGETHER, supra note 42, at 2 (noting that in 2013, seventy-three 
of eighty-one municipal courts in St. Louis County brought in more revenue than 
they needed to operate); It’s Not Just Ferguson, supra note 40, at 6 (noting that 
municipal courts in Florissant, Missouri produce $1.5 million in net revenue for 
city’s general fund). 
 87. BETTER TOGETHER, supra note 42, at 9 (rejecting public safety as a contributing 
factor); DOJ Ferguson Report, supra note 3, at 3, 5 (rejecting public safety and 
personal responsibility); Kohler et al., supra note 84 (rejecting personal 
responsibility concerns as an explanation for municipal court practices in 
Ferguson); Ferguson Forward Ep. 311, STAY TUNED (Dec. 18, 2014), http:// 
staytuned.ninenet.org/episodes/ferguson-forward/ (featuring Thomas Harvey of 
ArchCity Defenders in St. Louis rejecting personal responsibility).  
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March 2015, shortly after the Department of Justice released the report on its 
investigation into the Ferguson police department and municipal court,88 U.S. 
Representative Emanuel Cleaver II (Mo.-5) announced his intent to introduce 
legislation to ban law enforcement activities motivated solely by revenue gener-
ation,89 or “taxation by citation.”90 The Missouri Legislature aimed to do some-
thing similar, passing legislation in 2015 that limited the funds a municipality 
can take from traffic tickets and fines to 12.5 percent of its general revenue in St. 
Louis County and to twenty percent of general revenue in the rest of the state.91 
In signing the bill, Missouri Governor Jay Nixon remarked that, “Under this 
bill, cops will stop being revenue agents and go back to being cops.”92 Ongoing 
advocacy to replace St. Louis County’s eighty-one municipal courts with re-
gional or county courts also targets revenue incentives, under the rationale that 
judges employed directly by a single municipality are too vulnerable to pressure 
to raise municipal revenue.93 
The effectiveness of these policy responses at ending unconstitutional in-
carceration for criminal justice debt will be determined in large part by the ex-
tent to which that incarceration is driven by the revenue incentives the policies 
are designed to disrupt.94 Even the effectiveness of policy responses that do not 
 88. DOJ Ferguson Report, supra note 3. 
 89. Press Release, Emanuel Cleaver, II, Rep., U.S. House of Representatives, 
Congressman Cleaver Announces Introduction of The Fair Justice Act (Mar. 9, 
2015), http://cleaver.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/congressman-cleaver-
announces-introduction-of-the-fair-justice-act 
 90. Press Release, Emanuel Cleaver, II, Rep., U.S. House of Representatives, 
Congressman Cleaver Urges Immediate Congressional Action on Policing Reform 
(Apr. 29, 2015), http://cleaver.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/congressman 
-cleaver-urges-immediate-congressional-action-on-policing. Representative 
Cleaver’s proposed bill eventually was refined to bar a municipality from 
generating more than thirty percent of its general revenue from traffic tickets and 
fines. Id.  
 91. Mike Lear, Missouri Governor Signs Municipal Court Reform Bill with “Real Teeth,” 
MISSOURINET (July 9, 2015), http://www.missourinet.com/2015/07/09/missouri-
governor-signs-municipal-court-reform-bill-with-real-teeth/. 
 92. Robert Patrick, Almost a Year After Ferguson, Missouri Passes Court Reforms, 
GOVERNING, (July 13, 2015), http://www.governing.com/topics/public-justice 
-safety/tns-missouri-court-reform-law.html. 
 93. BETTER TOGETHER, supra note 42, at 4, 12; It’s Not Just Ferguson, supra note 40, at 2; 
FERGUSON COMM’N, STL POSITIVE CHANGE, FORWARD THROUGH FERGUSON: A 
PATH TOWARD RACIAL EQUITY 76 (Sept. 14, 2015) [hereinafter Ferguson Commission 
Report], http://apps.stlpublicradio.org/ferguson-commission-priorities/assets/ 
report.pdf. 
 94. Other factors directly related to how well these policy responses disrupt revenue 
incentives also will influence the effectiveness of the responses. For example, 
Missouri had revenue caps prior to the 2015 legislation but monitoring and 
enforcement of the caps was minimal. See BETTER TOGETHER, supra note 42, at 2-3. 
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specifically target revenue generation as a motive, but instead aim to control the 
practices through which courts maximize collection of revenue in individual 
cases—policy responses that consist primarily of restating and reinforcing long-
standing procedural protections for criminal justice debtors in constitutional 
law95—may be impaired if we do not confront other, unexamined motives that 
also underlie those practices. Accordingly, we will briefly examine the strengths 
and limitations of revenue generation as the controlling motive behind modern 
debtors’ prisons, as well as other possible contributing motivations. 
 
B. The Case for Revenue Generation as the Controlling Motive Behind  
Debtors’ Prisons 
 
In addition to the obvious relationship between the collection of municipal 
economic sanctions and the generation of municipal revenue, the two primary 
narratives that launched recent attention to modern debtors’ prisons—
Ferguson, broadly defined to encompass municipal court practices in St. Louis 
County, and private probation as it exists in some parts of the South—provide 
significant support for the claim that revenue generation is behind the practices 
that result in debtors’ prisons. 
The Department of Justice’s Ferguson Report documented that the number 
of citations and summonses issued annually for municipal violations in Fergu-
son increased by fifty percent over a four-year period beginning in July 2010.96 
While revenue from municipal violations represented over twelve percent of 
Ferguson’s total general revenue in fiscal years 2010 and 2011, Ferguson budget-
ed for a thirty percent increase in that revenue in fiscal year 2012.97 Law en-
forcement and the courts were able to exceed that target.98 After several consec-
utive cycles of budgeting for significant increases in municipal violation revenue 
and exceeding those budget targets, revenue from municipal violations was pro-
jected to constitute over twenty-three percent of the City’s general revenue in 
fiscal year 2015.99 
Moreover, the new revenue caps approved by the Missouri Legislature apply only 
to revenue from traffic violations, leaving municipalities free to raise unlimited 
revenue from tickets for other municipal offenses, such as offenses related to 
property maintenance. Monica Davey, Lawsuit Accuses Missouri City of Fining 
Homeowners to Raise Revenue, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 4, 2015), http://www.nytimes 
.com/2015/11/05/us/lawsuit-accuses-missouri-city-of-fining-homeowners-to-raise-
revenue.html. Nevertheless, if policy reforms that specifically target revenue 
generation are targeting the wrong thing, or only part of the problem, they will not 
be effective no matter how well enforced or how free of loopholes they are. 
 95. See infra text accompanying notes 169-171. 
 96. DOJ Ferguson Report, supra note 3, at 7. 
 97. Id. at 9. 
 98. Id. 
 99. See id. at 9-10. 
 107 
 
MarshGerrick FINALPROD.docx (Do Not Delete) 2/28/2016  4:37 PM 
YALE LAW & POLICY REVIEW 34 : 93 2015 
Any ambiguity over whether Ferguson’s steady increase in revenue from 
municipal violations was the uncalculated result of public safety priorities ra-
ther than a calculated quest for revenue was removed by emails from municipal 
officials that were released to the DOJ. In March 2010, Ferguson’s City Finance 
Director wrote to Chief of Police Thomas Jackson that “unless ticket writing 
ramps up significantly before the end of the year, it will be hard to significantly 
raise collections next year . . . . Given that we are looking at a substantial sales 
tax shortfall, it’s not an insignificant issue.”100 In March 2013, the Finance Direc-
tor again focused on increasing revenue from municipal violations, this time 
writing to City Manager John Shaw that “[c]ourt fees are anticipated to rise 
about 7.5%. I did ask the Chief if he thought the PD could deliver 10% increase. 
He indicated they could try.”101 
Like Ferguson, other municipalities in St. Louis County that rely on court 
fines and fees to fund a significant portion of their general expenses102 also in-
creased their revenue from fines and fees at the same time tax revenue was de-
clining.103 At least one city effectively held debtors hostage, reducing the 
amount of bail demanded as ransom for their release on a daily basis, in search 
of the maximum amount an individual’s family and friends could pay.104 A 
mayor in the county sent an email to his city’s police department, reminding 
officers that increasing the number of tickets issued would directly add to mu-
nicipal revenue and “affect pay adjustments at budget time.”105 
Revenue generation also plays a prominent role in jurisdictions with private 
probation companies—companies that emphasize their ability to increase col-
lection of municipal fines and fees when advertising their services to potential 
customers.106 Although the practices that exist in private probation systems are 
 100. Id. at 2. The City Finance Director is not named in the DOJ Report.  
 101. Id. 
 102. See supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text. 
 103. BETTER TOGETHER, supra note 42, at 2. 
 104. Jennings Complaint, supra note 41, at 37-38. 
 105. Tony Messenger, Welfare of the People Should Drive Court Reform, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH (Jan. 23, 2015), http://www.stltoday.com/news/opinion/columns/tony 
-messenger/messenger-welfare-of-the-people-should-drive-court-reform/article 
_e278e88a-51cb-5e31-842a-d77de0acfe41.html (quoting email from Mayor John 
Gwaltney of Edmundson, Missouri). 
 106. Sarah Stillman, Get Out of Jail, Inc., NEW YORKER (June 23, 2014), http://www 
.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/06/23/get-out-of-jail-inc. For example, Georgia-
based Freedom Probation tells potential municipal customers, “If your 
municipality is looking . . . to increase the collection of fines and court costs in the 
municipal court, please give our office a call today.” Id.  
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troubling,107 and some of them are undoubtedly illegal,108 it is the involvement 
of for-profit private companies that really fuels suspicion that these practices 
are motivated entirely by the goal of maximizing revenue. Probation fees paid 
by low-income debtors “make up most [private] probation companies’ entire 
stream of revenue and profits.”109 These revenues and profits were enough to 
put one private probation company, Judicial Correction Services, on Inc. maga-
zine’s list of “the fastest growing private companies in America” in 2010.110 
Ferguson and private probation systems do not provide the only evidence 
in support of the revenue generation motive. As we have noted, there is great 
intuitive appeal to the idea that municipalities that use oppressive tactics to col-
lect fines and costs for the municipal treasury are motivated to do so by the goal 
of maximizing municipal revenue. Moreover, the fact that forty-eight states 
have increased criminal and civil court fees, added new fees, or both since the 
onset of the recent recession111 suggests that revenue generation plays a role in 
communities beyond St. Louis County and private probation industry strong-
holds. 
 
C. Limitations on the Explanatory Power of Revenue Generation 
 
We now turn to examining evidence that cuts against the revenue genera-
tion motive as a complete explanation for the continued existence of debtors’ 
prisons. This evidence calls into question the extent to which policy responses 
to revenue-maximizing practices in St. Louis County and to private probation 
systems can be generalized effectively to the many other jurisdictions in which 
debtors’ prisons exist, including many municipalities in our home state of Tex-
as. 
Limitations on the power of revenue generation to explain the persistence 
of debtors’ prisons immediately become apparent upon examination of specific 
cases in which individuals have been jailed for failure to pay fines and fees. For 
 107. For example, the poorer a person is, the more time she will need to pay off her 
fines and fees in full, and the more of her limited income will be captured by 
monthly probation fees. Profiting from Probation, supra note 46, at 3. 
 108. See Order on Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 2, Burdette v. 
Harpersville, No. CV-2010-900183 (Shelby Cty., Ala. Cir. Ct. July 11, 2012) 
(“Defendants’ depositions present virtually undisputed evidence that criminal 
defendants appearing before the Harpersville Municipal Court have been 
subjected to repeated and ongoing violations of almost every safeguard afforded 
by the United States Constitution, the laws of the State of Alabama, and the Rules 
of Criminal Procedure.”). 
 109. Profiting from Probation, supra note 46, at 2-3. 
 110. Stillman, supra note 106.  
 111. Joseph Shapiro, As Court Fees Rise, the Poor Are Paying the Price, NAT’L PUB. RADIO 
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example, a National Public Radio story on criminal justice debt profiled Jared 
Thornburg, who was assessed $165 in fines and fees for a traffic offense in 
Westminster, Colorado.112 Thornburg was homeless and unemployed, and 
could not afford to pay the ticket. His fines and fees increased to $306 when he 
did not meet the initial payment deadline, and he eventually was jailed for fail-
ure to pay that amount. Thornburg spent ten days in jail, at a daily cost to the 
city of approximately $70.113 Westminster was not content merely to lose $306 
in uncollected revenue; it (more than) doubled down and incurred $700 in ac-
tual expenses on top of that, for a net loss to the municipality of $1,006. Similar-
ly, after Tom Barrett stole a $2 beer in Augusta, Georgia, the city jailed him for 
two months because he could not afford to pay $400 per month in court costs, 
including fees for electronic monitoring that would have allowed the city to su-
pervise him at a much lower cost than incarceration.114 Even at a conservative 
estimated incarceration cost of $50 per day, Augusta spent approximately 
$3,000 in a fruitless attempt to collect $800, for a net loss of $3,800.115 These cas-
es do not appear to reflect a revenue generation strategy,116 at least not one that 
is effective or rational.117 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. See id. The daily cost to jail one individual varies by jurisdiction. The average cost 
to jail someone in Texas is $59 per day. Solutions for Safely Reducing Incarceration: 
Basic Facts, TEX. CRIMINAL JUST. COAL., http://www.texascjc.org/basic-facts-1 (last 
visited Feb. 17, 2016). In New Hampshire, the daily cost is $110. AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES 
UNION OF N.H., DEBTORS’ PRISONS IN NEW HAMPSHIRE 7 (Sept. 23, 2015), http:// 
aclu-nh.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Final-ACLU-Debtors-Prisons-Report-9 
.23.15.pdf. These net losses in individual cases add up. For example, in 2013, New 
Hampshire incurred approximately $166,870 in jail costs in an attempt to collect 
an estimated $75,850 in unpaid fines that ultimately were never collected. Id. 
 116. Whether a jurisdiction charges jail fees (“pay to stay”) or instead awards jail credit 
(“pay or stay”) for this incarceration, see supra notes 70-73 and accompanying 
text, does not fundamentally change the math. At best, a jurisdiction that charges 
jail fees will have a bigger judgment against an indigent debtor who is extremely 
unlikely to ever pay in full; at worst, the jurisdiction will pay to jail the individual 
for more and longer periods of time for the same uncollectable debt. For example, 
Dana Burdette was jailed in Harpersville, Alabama for her inability to pay $2,000 
in debt arising from traffic tickets. Hannah Rappleye & Lisa Riordan Seville, The 
Town that Turned Poverty into a Prison Sentence, NATION (Mar. 14, 2014), http:// 
www.thenation.com/article/town-turned-poverty-prison-sentence/. As a result of 
the accumulation of a $31 per night jail fee, the amount of her debt grew to about 
$5,000. Id. Because Burdette could not pay the new total, she remained in jail for a 
total of 113 days before she was released without payment and without explanation. 
Id. In contrast, in jurisdictions that offer it, jail credit is, within the unkind world 
of debtors’ prisons, a relative kindness to the debtor—having “sat out” her fines 
and fees, she at least can walk out of jail free from criminal justice debt. It also 
serves as a release valve of sorts for the jurisdiction: the fact that it shuts the door 
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Irrationality is not a satisfying explanation for practices that result in thou-
sands of people across the country serving jail time in payment for municipal 
fines and fees each year.118 Some of this “irrationality” is almost certainly a con-
sequence of the fact that in some cases the financial incentives between the col-
lector and jailer are not properly aligned—i.e., the entity that is seeking to col-
lect the economic sanction is not the same entity that pays the cost of 
incarceration. For example, the cost of a private probation company’s decision 
to jail often is borne by the municipality that runs the jail.119 Similarly, a Texas 
county operating a jail may pay the price for a municipal judge’s decision to in-
carcerate a debtor.120 However, the occasional disconnect between the entity 
that is seeking to collect a debt and the entity that is paying the jail tab only gets 
us so far, not the least because the perfectly aligned incentives that exist in St. 
Louis County and other locations get us to the same debtors’ prison outcome.121 
Some judges feel that the threat of jail is the only way to accurately identify 
which debtors are able to pay and to scare payment out of those who can pay 
but have not.122 In these judges’ mental calculations, the cost of carrying out 
on any chance of future collections is offset to at least some extent by the fact that 
it also avoids the expense of repeat incarcerations. 
 117. This strategy is rendered even less effective by the fact that jailing a debtor often 
disrupts her employment, housing, family life, and/or child care arrangements, in 
a manner that makes it even less likely that she can pay the debt. For example, 
Jared Thornburg, see supra text accompanying notes 112-113, was about to start a 
new job after a period of unemployment when he was jailed for nonpayment of 
criminal fines and fees. Shapiro, supra note 111. While he was in jail, he lost the 
new job before he ever started it. Id.  
 118. Although 700,000 citations are resolved at least in part through jail credit in Texas 
each year, see supra text accompanying note 72, some individuals may have 
multiple citations; the number of unique individuals affected is unknown. 
“Thousands” is a conservative estimate of the number of individuals affected 
nationally, in light of the much larger number of citations involved in our state 
alone. 
 119. Profiting from Probation, supra note 46, at 53. 
 120. For example, the City of Austin, located in Travis County, Texas, provides 
magistration services for detainees arrested on county charges in exchange for 
using the county’s booking services for its own debtors. Interlocal Agreement 
Between Travis Cty. & City of Austin for Booking & Related Services, at §§ 3.05, 
4.01 (2011) (on file with authors). The City does not pay for the actual costs of 
incarcerating their debtors. Id. 
 121. See supra text accompanying note 93 (discussing advocates’ proposal to 
consolidate St. Louis County’s municipal courts at the county level in order to 
decrease incentives for municipal judges to raise revenue for the municipality that 
employs them). 
 122. See, e.g., Shaila Dewan, Court Conundrum: Offenders Who Can’t Pay, or Won’t, 
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 26, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/27/us/court 
-conundrum-offenders-who-cant-pay-or-wont.html (describing a judge who uses 
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that threat in cases where the debtor cannot pay may be offset by the amount 
collected from those who pay up when faced with the threat—in other words, it 
is a price that must be paid to make the threat effective. And it is a price that is 
further offset when family members and friends, who have no legal obligation 
to pay the court debt, in some cases come up with funds to get their loved ones 
out of jail.123 However, available data does not appear to support the claim that 
debtors’ prisons and related collection policies produce a net financial benefit 
for municipalities, despite their human cost. In Pennsylvania, for example, local 
governments must spend $7,000 to collect $4,000 in fines and court costs.124 
Data from Texas shows that the vast majority of fines and costs are paid within 
thirty days, without any threats of incarceration,125 and suggests that any in-
creases in collections that are later obtained with the aid of threats are marginal. 
There is no evidence to suggest that collection practices that are premised on 
the threat of incarceration for nonpayment are more necessary or cost-effective 
elsewhere.126 
 Finally, many of the characteristics that provide primary support for the 
revenue generation motive in Ferguson and private probation systems are not 
present in other jurisdictions that nevertheless routinely incarcerate individuals 
for failure to pay criminal fines and court costs. While there is widespread con-
sensus that municipal fragmentation in St. Louis County drives the quest for 
municipal revenue there, and many proposals to address debtors’ prisons in St. 
Louis focus on municipal court consolidation,127 fragmentation has not been 
raised as an issue in the many other jurisdictions that operate debtors’ pris-
ons.128 Moreover, debtors’ prisons also exist in municipalities that, unlike those 
threats of jail to determine whether debtor can pay or not and who believes that 
other ways of screening for ability to pay are impractical). 
 123. See, e.g., Jennings Complaint, supra note 41, at 4-5 (alleging that Jennings, 
Missouri has a policy of bargaining with family and friends of incarcerated debtors 
on the amount of money city will accept for release).  
 124. Reginald T. Shuford, The Overincarceration of America’s Poor: The Return of 
Debtor’s Prisons, 1 IMPACT 57, 62 (2015). 
 125. Tex. Office of Court Admin. studies on court collections in the cities of Abilene, 
Amarillo, Austin, Corpus Christi, El Paso, Garland, Pasadena, and Waco (on file 
with authors). 
 126. See MML Amicus Brief, supra note 84, at 26 (asserting that practices that produce 
debtors’ prisons cost exorbitant amounts of money and are inefficient); Tamar R. 
Birckhead, The New Peonage, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) 
(manuscript at 48), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2652557 (operating modern debtors’ 
prisons results in fiscal loss to state); R. Barry Ruback, The Abolition of Fines and 
Fees: Not Proven and Not Compelling, 10 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 569, 575 (2011) 
(questioning cost-effectiveness of economic sanctions for the poor at current high 
levels). 
 127. See supra note 93 and accompanying text. 
 128. See generally supra Part I.B. 
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in St. Louis County, are not dependent on ticket revenue for a significant por-
tion of their budget. Bowden, Georgia, where a municipal judge was videotaped 
threatening to jail individuals who did not pay their fines and fees, receives only 
3.8 percent of its revenue from fines and fees.129 Austin, Texas jails hundreds of 
people a year for unpaid debt but derives even less of its municipal revenue 
from court fines and fees—only 0.5 percent.130 Courts also are perfectly capable 
of jailing individuals for failure to pay fines and fees without any assistance 
from private probation companies. Ferguson and Austin are just two examples 
of municipalities without private probation where that practice is common. 
 
D. Other Potential Factors Contributing to the Existence of Modern Debtors’ 
Prisons 
 
Although there is compelling, direct evidence that revenue generation is a 
motivating factor for the practices that sustain debtors’ prisons,131 it is not a 
completely satisfying explanation for those practices. Courts may generate rev-
enue when payments made by all offenders are taken into consideration,132 but 
municipalities are losing money in their interactions with individuals who do 
not promptly pay fines and fees, many of whom become the people who end up 
in debtors’ prisons. Debtors’ prisons do not make sense solely in terms of reve-
nue. Other factors must be contributing to their existence.133 We will consider 
possible candidates. 
Public safety. Public safety often is the first motivation municipalities claim 
when challenged for their ticketing and collection practices.134 Municipalities 
 129. Shaila Dewan, A Surreptitious Courtroom Video Prompts Changes in a Georgia 
Town, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 4, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/05/us/a 
-surreptitious-courtroom-video-prompts-changes-in-a-georgia-town.html. 
 130. See CITY OF AUSTIN, TEX., AUSTIN, TEXAS 2013-2014 APPROVED BUDGE VOLUME ONE 
(2013) https://assets.austintexas.gov/budget/13-14/downloads/fy14_approved 
_volume_I.pdf. 
 131. See supra text accompanying notes 100-101. 
 132. See e.g., BETTER TOGETHER, supra note 42, at 2, 9 (finding that municipal courts in 
St. Louis County have an average net revenue of $488,357).  
 133. See also Erika L. Wood, Their Debt to Society, 1 IMPACT 52, 54 (2015) (“A closer look 
at these paths to debtors’ prisons reveals that there is something motivating these 
enforcement tactics besides just money.”). 
 134. See, e.g., Jason Rosenbaum, St. Ann Administration Pushes Back Against 
Schweich—And Movement to Revamp Municipal Courts, ST. LOUIS PUB. RADIO 
(Oct. 13, 2014), http://news.stlpublicradio.org/post/st-ann-administrator-pushes-
back-against-schweich-and-movement-revamp-municipal-courts (describing a 
municipal administrator’s defense of ticketing campaign directed at speeders by 




MarshGerrick FINALPROD.docx (Do Not Delete) 2/28/2016  4:37 PM 
YALE LAW & POLICY REVIEW 34 : 93 2015 
assert they must stop speeders to keep their residents safe;135 they need to en-
force property codes to maintain the safety and livability of their communi-
ties.136 
The DOJ roundly rejected public safety as a motive for the ticketing and 
policing practices documented in Ferguson.137 Certainly many of the practices 
there, such as regularly issuing multiple citations with cumulative fines for a 
single traffic incident,138 do not clearly enhance public safety. Other practices, 
such as issuing warrants for nonpayment of fines and fees that will result in the 
incarceration of individuals whose underlying offenses were not deemed to jus-
tify a jail sentence,139 are common in many jurisdictions and highly dubious as a 
matter of public safety.140 Claims that certain offenses—such as “contempt of 
cop” offenses141 or those that often result from poverty, such as for cars142 or 
 135. Id. 
 136. See, e.g., Jennifer S. Mann, Municipalities Ticket for Trees and Toys, as Traffic 
Revenue Declines, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (May 24, 2015), http://www.stltoday 
.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/municipalities-ticket-for-trees-and-toys-as 
-traffic-revenue-declines/article_42739be7-afd1-5f66-b325-e1f654ba9625.html 
(quoting Calverton Park Mayor Jim Paunovich stating, “We are an older 
neighborhood and once that cancer hits, you can’t get rid of it”). 
 137. DOJ Ferguson Report, supra note 3, at 2-3, 10-12, 43, 56.  
 138. Id. at 11. 
 139. Id. at 56. 
 140. In its debtors’ prison cases, see supra Part I.A.2, the U.S. Supreme Court has been 
deeply skeptical of claims that the state has any penological interest in using 
incarceration to enforce a criminal judgment if the state did not originally impose 
a sentence of jail for the underlying offense. This skepticism was evident whether 
the jail term for debt resulted in a penalty that exceeded the statutory maximum, 
see Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970), or 
whether the state chose not to impose an available jail penalty at the time of initial 
adjudication, see Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 (1983). However, it did not go so 
far as to find that the state never had a penological interest in these situations. See, 
e.g., Bearden, 461 U.S. at 670 (“The decision to place the defendant on probation, 
however, reflects a determination by the sentencing court that the State’s 
penological interests do not require imprisonment. A probationer’s failure to 
make reasonable efforts to repay his debt to society may indicate that this original 
determination needs reevaluation, and imprisonment may now be required to 
satisfy the State’s interests.”) (citations omitted). 
 141. See DOJ Ferguson Report, supra note 3, at 25 (discussing prevalence of arrests in 
Ferguson for “contempt of cop” offenses such as Failure to Comply). 
 142. See id. at 12 (discussing ticketing for broken headlights and other equipment that 
requires money to repair); see also ArchCity White Paper, supra note 2, at 3-4 
(discussing relationship between poverty and offenses such as expired vehicle 
registration and outdated inspections). 
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houses143 needing repair—serve legitimate public safety interests should be 
viewed very skeptically.144 And emails focused entirely on revenue rather than 
public safety do not lend credibility to Ferguson officials’ public safety asser-
tions.145 
The significance of public safety as a complicating motive will vary by of-
fense, and to a lesser degree by how else, beyond ticketing and issuing warrants, 
a municipality responds to that offense.146 At a general level, we do not think 
public safety can be rejected as categorically as the DOJ rejected it in Ferguson. 
Putting aside contempt of cop and poverty offenses, there is some number of 
municipal offenses that have undisputed public safety implications, and juris-
dictions have “a fundamental interest in appropriately punishing persons—rich 
and poor—who violate” those laws.147 For example, speeding, the archetypal 
traffic offense, presents a legitimate public safety concern, at least at certain 
speeds.148 Municipalities’ legitimate interest in controlling and deterring this 
type of dangerous behavior, regardless of the offending individual’s income, 
must be taken seriously as a factor contributing to the ticketing and collections 
practices associated with debtors’ prisons.149 As St. Louis County court person-
 143. See Davey, supra note 94; Mann, supra note 136. 
 144. Cf. Statement of Interest of the United States at 13-16, Bell v. Boise, 993 F. Supp. 2d 
1237 (D. Idaho Aug. 6, 2015) (No. 1:09-cv-00540) (asserting, in case involving 
Eighth Amendment challenge to municipal anti-camping ordinance, that the 
court should consider whether conforming one’s conduct to an ordinance is 
possible for people who are homeless, and that ordinances that amount to the 
criminalization of homelessness are unconstitutional) .  
 145. See supra text accompanying notes 100-101. 
 146. See, e.g., DOJ Ferguson Report, supra note 3, at 12, 91 (suggesting that if the city has 
public safety concerns arising from disrepair of cars on the road, it could address 
that interest by issuing “fix-it” tickets dismissed without charge upon the 
completion of repairs, thereby allowing low-income drivers to use their limited 
income to address the public safety concern through repairs).  
 147. Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 669 (1983). 
 148. Even municipalities that receive a very high proportion of municipal revenue from 
speeding tickets allegedly have policies of writing tickets only to “extreme” 
speeders who exceed a range of common, de minimis speeding. See, e.g., 
Rosenbaum, supra note 134 (noting that St. Ann only writes tickets for drivers 
going 11 miles or more over speed limit); Katie Wilcox, A Handful of Towns Rely 
Heavily on Money from Traffic Tickets, ROCKY MOUNTAIN PBS NEWS (Apr. 29, 
2015), http://inewsnetwork.org/2015/04/29/a-handful-of-colorado-towns-rely-
heavily-on-money-from-traffic-tickets/ (describing how Morrison, Colorado, 
which gets 52 percent of its revenue from fines, only writes tickets for speeders 
going 15 miles or more over limit). 
 149. This position does not concede that collections practices that lead to debtors’ 
prisons are necessary for public safety. Alternative approaches to the enforcement 
of legitimate public safety offenses are discussed in Part III. Rather, we contend 
that arguments that reject public safety as a factor that influences the existence and 
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nel noted, “just because an individual cannot pay the fine or fee for a traffic vio-
lation does not make them less of a safety risk on the road.”150 
Fairness. A regime in which one person is punished for certain prohibited 
behavior while another person who engages in the same behavior evades pun-
ishment is likely to be viewed as unfair. Even while imposing limitations on in-
carceration for nonpayment of fines and fees, the U.S. Supreme Court recog-
nized that “[t]he State is not powerless to enforce judgments against those 
financially unable to pay a fine; indeed, a different result would amount to in-
verse discrimination since it would enable an indigent to avoid both the fine 
and the imprisonment for nonpayment whereas other defendants must always 
suffer one or the other conviction.”151 
This conception of fairness can create resistance to policies that would re-
sult in the widespread waiver of fines and fees for individuals who cannot afford 
to pay them, notwithstanding statutory authority for waiver in many jurisdic-
tions.152 The resistance to waiver may be particularly strong when an offense is 
punishable solely or primarily with fines, as are many municipal violations.153 
scale of debtors’ prisons, by focusing on questionable practices such as stacking 
citations, etc., downplay real public safety interests that must be engaged in order 
to develop an effective policy response to debtors’ prisons. 
 150. Rachel Lippman, Advocacy Group Proposes Municipal Court Reforms, How Do They 
Compare?, ST. LOUIS PUB. RADIO (Feb. 2, 2015), http://news.stlpublicradio.org/ 
post/advocacy-group-proposes-municipal-court-reforms-how-do-they-compare 
(citing unnamed St. Louis County court personnel). 
 151. Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 244 (1970). 
 152. See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 111 (noting that courts are more likely to put low-
income individuals on payment plans than to exercise statutory authority to waive 
fees). Even in the midst of all of the attention to illegal practices that produced 
debtors’ prisons in Ferguson and other municipalities in St. Louis County, many 
local “amnesty” programs were limited to recalling arrest warrants without 
reducing the amount of underlying debt, Camille Phillips, More Than 50 St. Louis 
Municipalities Participate in Better Family Life Warrant Amnesty Project, ST. LOUIS 
PUB. RADIO (Aug. 2, 2015), http://news.stlpublicradio.org/post/more-50-st-louis 
-municipalities-participate-better-family-life-warrant-amnesty-project, and 
advocacy directed at urging courts to exercise their waiver authority to forgive 
underlying debt was focused on cleaning the slate of old debts, MISSOURIANS ORG. 
FOR REFORM & EMPOWERMENT, TRANSFORMING ST. LOUIS COUNTY’S RACIST 
MUNICIPAL COURTS 1 (2015), http://populardemocracy.org/sites/default/files/ 
publications/Transforming%20St.%20Louis%20County’s%20Racist%20Municipal%
20Courts%20(2).pdf. When it came to addressing how to deal with inability to pay 
in future cases, prospective policy reforms involved converting unpaid debts to 
civil judgments rather than waiver. See, e.g., Order at 3, Jenkins v. Jennings, No. 
4:15-cv-00252 (E.D. Mo., Aug. 26, 2015) (agreed court order in settlement of 
litigation initiated by Jennings Complaint, supra note 41) [hereinafter Jennings 
Agreed Order]. 
 153. For example, municipal courts in Texas have jurisdiction within the territorial 
limits of the municipality over offenses that arise under the ordinances of the 
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The absence of another readily available punishment for the ‘privileged’ 
group—here, used atypically to describe low-income individuals who would be 
candidates for waiver—makes the law feel toothless. Michigan District Court 
Judge Raymond Voet captured this concept of fairness perfectly when sentenc-
ing a man to three days in jail for failure to pay $155: “[A]m I supposed to tell 
the rest of the world, the rest of the law-abiding citizens, that they’re chumps 
and fools for having respected the law[?]”154 
Personal Responsibility. Personal responsibility is closely related to fairness, 
in that it is premised on the belief that individuals should take responsibility for 
their actions by facing the consequences of those actions. If a person chooses to 
engage in prohibited behavior and, as a result, incurs a punishment, she should 
pay the price—literally, in the case of fines and fees for municipal violations. 
Personal responsibility is a particularly controversial potential motive for 
practices that produce debtors’ prisons. The rhetoric of personal responsibility 
invokes the convict leasing system of the Reconstruction and Jim Crow eras, in 
which former slaves and their descendants were forced by southern states to 
demonstrate “responsibility” for alleged, often spurious, debts by paying off 
those debts through forced labor.155 Modern debtors’ prisons can appear to be a 
merely re-branded system for limiting the physical liberty and economic mobil-
ity of Black Americans, when in communities such as Ferguson, Blacks are 
stopped more frequently than Whites, searched more frequently than Whites, 
ticketed more frequently than Whites, and jailed for failure to pay fines and 
costs more frequently than Whites.156 In this context, the rhetoric of personal 
municipality and that are punishable by a fine not to exceed $2,000 (for 
ordinances that govern fire safety, zoning, or public health and sanitation) or $500 
(all other ordinances). TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 4.14(a). Texas municipalities 
also have jurisdiction over fine-only offenses arising under state law. Id. art. 
4.14(b). 
 154. Shapiro, supra note 56. Another municipal court judge, Frank Vatterot in St. Louis 
County, suggested that reducing fines and costs for low-income criminal court 
debtors may pose an Equal Protection Problem: “Equal protection works both 
ways. In it a violation of the Equal Protection Clause to say when you don’t have 
the money you go to jail. The question is the flip side, whether you can have two 
people with the same charge—say assault—and the person who has money pays a 
fine but the one who doesn’t pays nothing.” William Freivogel, Two Visions of 
Municipal Court Reform, ST. LOUIS PUB. RADIO (Nov. 12, 2014), http://news 
.stlpublicradio.org/post/two-visions-municipal-court-reform.  
 155. See Birckhead, supra note 126, at 12-19 (outlining the legal history of peonage 
starting at end of U.S. Civil War). 
 156. For example, Black people, who make up 67 percent of Ferguson’s population, 
account for 85 percent of the Ferguson Police Department’s traffic stops, 90 
percent of its citations, and 96 percent of known arrests made exclusively because 
of an outstanding municipal warrant. DOJ Ferguson Report, supra note 3, at 62-63. 
Black people are 2.07 times more likely to be searched during a traffic stop. Id. at 
62; see also Birckhead, supra note 126, at 53 (discussing evidence that courts 
impose higher discretionary fines and costs on people of color than on Whites); 
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responsibility rings of barely disguised,157 and at times undisguised,158 racism. 
This, in turn, has led some challengers of modern debtors’ prisons to deny per-
sonal responsibility legitimacy by dismissing it out of hand as a factor that must 
be engaged on the merits in policy responses to debtors’ prisons.159 
We are aware of how professed commitment to personal responsibility has 
been used to provide cover for racial bias, and we empathize with the instinct to 
dismiss it merely as a façade. However, we do not think it can be so easily dis-
pensed with if we are to address the prevalence and persistence of modern 
debtors’ prisons effectively. If for no other reason, we cannot ignore personal 
responsibility’s influence on debtors’ prisons because personal responsibility is 
built into the foundations of constitutional limitations on incarceration for 
debt. Bearden and related cases do not provide relief to individuals whose fail-
ure to pay fines and fees is “willful.”160 To the Bearden Court, even an indigent 
person’s failure to pay could be willful if she fails to make “sufficient bona fide 
efforts” to seek employment because lack of effort “may reflect an insufficient 
concern for paying the debt [s]he owes to society for [her] crime.”161 In such 
circumstances, the Court wrote, imprisonment could be justified.162 This stand-
ard leaves it to the discretion of individual judges—applying their own life ex-
periences, values, and biases, both explicit and implicit—to determine who is 
being responsible despite financial hardship and who is being irresponsible and 
thus can be jailed.163 To the extent that racism is embedded in notions of per-
It’s Not Just Ferguson, supra note 40, at 14 (finding that, holding poverty rates 
constant, St. Louis County municipalities with a higher percentage of Black 
residents have statistically significant higher court fees per resident). 
 157. Birckhead, supra note 126, at 10, 53; Ta-Nahesi Coates, The Gangsters of Ferguson, 
ATLANTIC (Mar. 5, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/03/ 
The-Gangsters-Of-Ferguson/386893/. 
 158. The DOJ published a number of emails involving police and court supervisors in 
Ferguson that voiced ugly and time-tested racial stereotypes. DOJ Ferguson Report, 
supra note 3, at 72. The DOJ cited this naked racial bias on the part of Ferguson 
officials as a reason for discounting appeals to personal responsibility as a 
justification for municipal court enforcement efforts: “[T]he City’s personal-
responsibility refrain is telling; it reflects many of the same racial stereotypes found 
in the emails between police and court supervisors.” Id. at 5.  
 159. See supra sources cited note 87.  
 160. 461 U.S. 660, 672 (1983). See generally infra Part I.A.2.  
 161. Id. at 668. 
 162. Id. 
 163. See Katherine Beckett & Alexes Harris, Of Cash and Conviction: Monetary Sanctions 
as Misguided Policy, 10 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 509, 525 (2011) (“‘Willful’ is a 
highly elastic concept, one that fails to create a meaningful barrier to the 
incarceration of indigent debtors.”); Birckhead, supra note 126, at 54 (concluding 
that legal standards such as Bearden’s “sufficient bona fide efforts to pay” leaves 
courts with “unfettered discretion to determine which defendants qualify for relief 
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sonal responsibility, it also is embedded in Bearden. To the extent that we con-
cede that incarceration may be appropriate when someone is able to pay crimi-
nal fines and fees without hardship but refuses to do so,164 we are conceding 
that personal responsibility must be grappled with when we confront modern 
debtors’ prisons. 
 
III. Policy Implications 
 
We now turn to what this more complicated view of the factors that con-
tribute to the existence of modern debtors’ prisons suggests for the direction of 
continued efforts for policy change in this area. 
First, incorporating motivations beyond revenue generation into our un-
derstanding of debtors’ prisons raises significant questions about the potential 
effectiveness of policy reforms that already have been adopted in Ferguson’s 
wake. Legislation requiring greater transparency and placing other limitations 
on private probation systems, such as legislation recently passed in Georgia,165 is 
too grounded in the specific context of local practices to provide a roadmap for 
policy reform in the many jurisdictions without private probation that never-
theless have debtors’ prisons. If generally applied, revenue caps such as the 12.5 
percent cap the Missouri General Assembly recently imposed on municipalities 
in St. Louis County166 will not affect many of the worst municipal actors167—
including Ferguson itself, which is close to complying with the cap even with 
the abusive practices roundly condemned in the DOJ report.168 
and which do not.”); Shapiro, supra note 111 (finding large discrepancies across 
the country in how courts determine whether nonpayment is willful or 
involuntary); see also Balko, supra note 1 (quoting Thomas Harvey of ArchCity 
Defenders: “[Y]ou need people in these [judicial] positions who have some 
empathy for the people in front of them, who know what it’s like to have to 
prioritize bills, to at least know someone who knows what it’s like to, say, let your 
car insurance expire in order to pay a medical bill.”).  
 164. See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 56 (quoting Miriam Aukerman of the American Civil 
Liberties Union of Michigan: “It’s not that it’s wrong to charge people money as a 
way to punish them. But there have to be alternatives for people who can’t pay.” 
(emphasis added)); Shuford, supra note 124, at 64 (“No one is suggestion that 
those who willfully avoid paying fines and fees should get off scot-free. The 
concern is for those who genuinely cannot pay these costs.”). 
 165. H.B. 310, R.S. (Ga. 2015).  
 166. See supra text accompanying note 91. 
 167. See supra text accompanying notes 129-130. 
 168. Jason Rosenbaum, On the Trail: Five Takeaways from SB5, the Sweeping, 
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These complicating motivations also cast doubt on reform strategies that 
hew literally to Bearden’s procedural protections. Advocates recently have in-
serted language restating Bearden’s procedural requirements into state stat-
utes,169 court settlements,170 and judicial resources.171 This approach often is 
pursued in combination with other reforms that aim to disrupt revenue genera-
tion;172 because revenue incentives cannot be removed from municipal ticketing 
entirely, the accompanying procedural reforms are intended to limit the prac-
tices that judges can use to collect revenue in individual cases. 
Although it is possible that on the margins some judges may be inspired to 
comply with Bearden even at this late date because the state legislature or an-
other court effectively says “We really really mean it,” or because a bench card 
reminds them of the law’s requirements,173 there is little reason to be confident 
that a sufficient number of the judges who have ignored Bearden entirely or 
construed its protections narrowly for over thirty years will change their ways.174 
 169. H.B. 14-1061, 69th Leg., 2d R.S. (Co. 2014) (barring incarceration for nonpayment 
unless willful). 
 170. E.g., Agreement to Settle Injunctive and Declaratory Relief Claims, Mitchell v. 
Montgomery, No. 2:14-cv-00186 (M.D. Ala. Nov. 17, 2014) (incorporating judicial 
procedures that include prohibition on incarcerating individuals who are unable 
to pay fines and fees). 
 171. See Tina Rosenberg, Out of Debtors’ Prison, With Law as the Key, N.Y. TIMES: 
OPINIONATOR BLOG (Mar. 27, 2015), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/ 
03/27/shutting-modern-debtors-prisons/ (discussing new bench card language in 
Ohio that lists steps for determining ability to pay, and acceptable and 
unacceptable methods for collecting fines and costs). 
 172. For example, in St. Louis County, advocates pushed for municipal court 
consolidation, see supra text accompanying note 93, at the same time they sued 
municipalities in the county for violating Bearden and related cases, see Ferguson 
Complaint, supra note 34; Jennings Complaint, supra note 41, eventually resulting 
in a settlement agreement in Jennings that included protections against 
incarceration for debt contained in existing case law, see Jennings Agreed Order, 
supra note 152.  
 173. See Austin Complaint, supra note 60 (alleging existence of practices that violate 
Bearden, despite the existence of bench card provisions that lay out Bearden’s 
requirements); Taggart & Campbell, supra note 59 (providing data and numerous 
examples of Bearden violations in Texas, despite existence of same bench card). 
But see Rosenberg, supra note 171 (noting that complaints about incarceration for 
debt fell precipitously in Ohio when bench card was amended to address Bearden).  
 174. Our skepticism about the possibility that increased education about and awareness 
of Bearden’s requirements alone will significantly change judicial behavior in this 
area is reinforced by the fact that many jurisdictions continued to violate Bearden 
even after the Ferguson protests brought sustained media attention to this issue 
and the continued existence of debtors’ prisons. For example, over a year after 
Ferguson, the City of Austin continued to incarcerate individuals who could not 
afford to pay their traffic ticket debt. See Austin Complaint, supra note 60. 
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On the contrary, the fact that deeply held, if sometimes unacknowledged, atti-
tudes about personal responsibility are embedded in Bearden’s procedural 
framework gives us every reason to doubt it.175 Debtors’ prisons exist even 
where ability-to-pay hearings and other procedural protections required under 
Bearden are in place.176 In these jurisdictions, judges simply find individuals’ 
nonpayment to be willful based on the clothes they wear, the tattoos they have, 
or because they are able-bodied and therefore must not have looked for a job 
hard enough.177 At best, these experiences suggest that judges are uncomfortable 
with, and ill equipped to make, the quasi-moral judgments about responsibility 
that Bearden requires of them.178 At worst, they suggest that racism acting under 
cover of personal responsibility will influence judicial decisions that sort debt-
ors who make good faith efforts to pay their fines from willful scofflaws, the de-
serving poor from the undeserving, and the free from those who may remain in 
debtors’ prisons even under Bearden.179 
Other commentators also have recognized the limitations of these first-
wave responses to modern debtors’ prisons.180 We conclude with an examina-
tion of a handful of policy reforms put forth by those commentators and by ad-
vocates working to end modern debtors’ prisons. We specifically consider what 
our multi-factor explanation for the persistence of debtors’ prisons suggests 
about the viability and effectiveness of various proposed reforms. 
Eliminating poverty penalties and offenses that target disenfranchised commu-
nities. One proposed policy response to modern debtors’ prisons is the elimina-
tion of “poverty penalties” in the form of extra fees imposed on individuals who 
cannot immediately afford to pay fines and costs,181 or even placing significant 
restrictions on the prosecution of “contempt of cop” and poverty offenses to 
reduce the total burden of criminal fines and costs on minority and low-income 
communities.182 These proposals have obvious appeal. Eliminating these penal-
ties and offenses would not compromise public safety,183 and would promote 
 175. See supra notes 160-163 and accompanying text. 
 176. See supra text accompanying notes 67-69.  
 177. Id.; see also Taggart & Campbell, supra note 59 (citing judge who in hearings has 
found at least eight homeless individuals able to pay). 
 178. See, e.g., Dewan, supra note 122; see also supra note 163 and accompanying text. 
 179. See supra notes 155-159 and accompanying text. 
 180. See, e.g., Beckett & Harris, supra note 163, at 524-25; Birckhead, supra note 126, at 
54. 
 181. E.g., Birckhead, supra note 126, at 33, 55-56. 
 182. E.g., DOJ Ferguson Report, supra note 3, at 91 (recommending that documented 
supervisory approval be required for arrests for “contempt of cop” violations and 
that violations for needed car repairs be treated as correctable violations for which 
officers should issue “fix-it” tickets that do not result in any fines or costs). 
 183. See supra notes 138-144 and accompanying text. 
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fairness by removing penalties for offenses for which only minority and low-
income communities are punished.184 These proposals are consistent with per-
sonal responsibility because they target status offenses rather than behavior over 
which individuals have control. And while eliminating these penalties entirely 
would have a negative financial impact, that impact would be mitigated by the 
fact that the penalties already are assessed primarily against people who cannot 
afford to pay them.185 
However, even if these reforms are implemented, we still will face the prob-
lem of what to do when someone ticketed for an offense that poses legitimate 
public safety concerns, such as extreme speeding, cannot afford to pay assessed 
fines and costs. With this in mind, we turn to more broadly applicable pro-
posals. 
Establishing objective financial standards for willful nonpayment. In order to 
avoid the risk that debtors’ prisons will continue to exist even if Bearden’s pro-
cedural protections are in place,186 advocates have built objective criteria for de-
termining who is able to pay into some of the recent settlement agreements 
reached in debtors’ prison litigation.187 This approach mitigates concern that 
subjective judgments about a debtor’s personal responsibility, and all of the po-
tential for bias that comes with those judgments, will limit the debtor’s access to 
alternative punishments and relief from incarceration for debt. 
However, it is difficult to adopt a simple, objective test for ability to pay 
that also captures the relational aspect of the ability-to-pay inquiry—i.e., the 
fact that whether a person is able to pay a debt depends not only on the amount 
of her income but also on the amount of her debt.188 In practice, and presuma-
 184. See supra notes 141-144 and accompanying text. 
 185. In our consideration of proposed policy reforms, we will consider the potential 
revenue implications of proposed reforms. This approach is consistent with our 
belief that a policy response is likely to be more effective if it is developed with a 
full consideration of the multiple motives that underlie the practices we are trying 
to change. Specifically with respect to revenue, different policy responses could be 
reconciled with Bearden, and we have little doubt policymakers will consider the 
projected revenue implications of various options when evaluating how to bring 
their jurisdictions into compliance with the law. However, this is not to suggest 
that a negative revenue impact means that a policy response should not be 
adopted if it is necessary to bring a jurisdiction into compliance with Bearden, or 
that a negative revenue impact may not be outweighed by other considerations. By 
necessity, our consideration of the potential revenue impact of various reforms is 
speculative and, because any negative revenue impact would be offset to at least 
some extent by reduced enforcement costs, indeterminate.  
 186. See supra notes 67-69, 176 and accompanying text. 
 187. See, e.g., Jennings Agreed Order, supra note 152, at 2. 
 188. Cf. TEX. INDIGENT DEF. COMM’N, ORDERS FOR REPAYMENT OF APPOINTED 
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bly in an attempt to achieve a negotiated resolution to pending litigation, the 
objective standards for ability to pay that have been adopted post-Ferguson, 
such as having income at or below 125 percent of the federal poverty guide-
lines,189 are almost certainly under-inclusive. If the standard were applied strict-
ly, a single individual who makes $14,700 a year would be deemed able to pay 
any amount of criminal justice debt and would be subject to incarceration for 
willful nonpayment.190 If the objective criteria only acts as a presumption and 
floor, the objective criteria would benefit the most destitute debtors but would 
leave many low-income debtors exposed to the familiar challenges posed by the 
personal responsibility considerations embedded in Bearden. 
Increasing access to alternative measures for discharging offenses: Eliminating 
financial eligibility barriers to alternative measures. Municipalities including 
Philadelphia and San Diego allow all individuals ticketed for municipal offenses 
to discharge liability for those offenses through specified alternative measures 
such as community service.191 This policy solution neatly sidesteps the personal 
responsibility landmines that render Bearden ineffective as a practical limitation 
on modern debtors’ prisons. It also largely satisfies fairness concerns, because 
all individuals who commit municipal offenses could elect alternative measures. 
An offender with financial resources may choose to pay a fine over community 
service because that is less of a burden on her, but the fact that she could have 
=1455755483/RO=10/RU=http%3a%2f%2ftidc.texas.gov%2fmedia%2f16676%2fAttor
ney-Fee-Recoupment-Procedures-and-Orders.docx/RK=0/RS=5t.9bdI 
_87zfxcewnNyPlxZfK34- (last visited Feb. 17, 2016) (downloadable file) (noting 
that an individual who is “indigent” for purposes of appointment of counsel 
because she cannot afford to hire a private lawyer may nevertheless have the 
“ability to pay” all or part of the government’s expenses for appointment of 
counsel, because the government’s expenses are less than a private lawyer’s fee).  
 189. Jennings Agreed Order, supra note 152, at 2. 
 190. Income Levels for Individuals Eligible for Assistance, 80 Fed. Reg. 5485-6 (Feb. 2, 
2015). 
 191. See CALIFORNIANS FOR SAFETY & JUSTICE & LOCAL SAFETY SOLUTIONS PROJECT, 
BREAKING THE CYCLE OF LOW-LEVEL CRIME: PUBLIC SAFETY INNOVATIONS DURING 
AN ERA OF CHANGE, (2015), http://libcloud.s3.amazonaws.com/211/aa/1/617/ 
StoppingLowLevelCrimeBrief_7.10.15.pdf. In Philadelphia, participants in the 
city’s Accelerated Misdemeanor Programs have the opportunity to discharge their 
liability for specific low-level offenses through community service, regardless of 
their income level. Id. at 15. Twenty to twenty-five percent of all misdemeanor 
cases in Philadelphia are disposed of through these programs, which have saved 
the city millions of dollars through decreases in recidivism and court and police 
costs. Id. In San Diego, all defendants in community court can have their charge 
dismissed if they elect to perform sixteen hours of community service. Id. at 16. 
While defendants with financial resources have to pay a program fee of $120 to the 
city’s community service provider, indigent slots are available at no cost. Id.  
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chosen community service means that community service will not feel like non-
punitive “special treatment” available only to low-income communities.192 
The revenue implications of this policy approach are difficult to predict, 
and would depend on whether individuals who have the resources to pay the 
fine and costs in full choose available alternative measures instead. At the very 
least, any revenue loss would be offset at least in part by avoiding the adminis-
trative costs associated with conducting ability-to-pay hearings, and the costs 
that governments incur to incarcerate individuals for nonpayment when courts 
get the ability-to-pay finding wrong.193 
Identifying acceptable alternative measures for discharging offenses: Waivers, 
sliding scale fines, and community service. Even if policies aimed at providing 
more people the opportunity to discharge their liability for offenses using alter-
native measures are successful, whether or not those policies will prove effective 
at ending debtors’ prisons will depend in large part on what specific alternative 
measures are available—whether there is community consensus that they are 
appropriate, and whether with them it is any more possible for low-income in-
dividuals to comply with court judgments. 
For example, after Ferguson many advocates in the region pushed for the 
widespread waiver of criminal fines and fees.194 A similar approach, involving 
drastic reductions in fines and fees, has succeeded in clearing large warrant and 
debt backlogs in a small number of jurisdictions.195 However, even though the 
Ferguson proposal was limited to the waiver of past debts accumulated under 
practices that violated the U.S. Constitution, it met great resistance.196 Concerns 
about the public safety, fairness, and personal responsibility implications of 
waiver of fines and costs likely doom it to play a minor, backward-looking role 
in ending debtors’ prisons, despite the fact that it is an acceptable alternative 
measure in case law197 and often under state statute.198 It is easily perceived as 
 192. On the other hand, the fact that an individual with financial resources can 
discharge liability for the offense with what may be, for her, a very minor financial 
inconvenience, while that option is effectively unavailable to low-income 
individuals who commit the same offense, itself is arguably unfair. See, e.g., 
Beckett & Harris, supra note 163, at 521 (“The imposition of monetary sanctions 
absent consideration of defendants income in inherently class biased, as these 
sanctions post a disproportionate challenge to, and burden on, the poor.”). 
 193. See supra notes 112-115 and accompanying text. 
 194. See supra sources cited note 152. 
 195. See Shapiro, supra note 111 (describing New Jersey’s Fugitive Safe Surrender 
program, through which 4,500 individuals with outstanding tickets turned 
themselves in and had their warrants cleared after making payments of, for 
example, $199 to discharge what was originally a $10,000 debt). 
 196. See supra sources cited note 152. 
 197. Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 672 (1983). 
 198. See, e.g., supra note 80 and accompanying text. 
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letting an individual off the hook without any punishment, in a manner that 
does not deter behavior that endangers public safety and that is not fair to oth-
ers who are held accountable for the same behavior. 
Of course, one possible way to overcome resistance to a complete waiver of 
fines and fees is to identify one or more alternative punishments that would 
prevent a low-income individual from getting off entirely. One solution put 
forth by advocates is to have “sliding scale” fines, where the less money a person 
has, the less she would be charged.199 This policy proposal engages a perspective 
on fairness that provides a counterbalance to the impulse that underlies re-
sistance to waivers. There is no question that fines and costs have a dispropor-
tionate impact on people who lack the income to quickly pay them.200 A munic-
ipal citation that is a brief inconvenience or that necessitates a temporary 
sacrifice for a person with resources can trigger months and even years of crim-
inal supervision and penury for those who are already starting off with insuffi-
cient income to pay their fines and costs.201 Sliding scale fines are fair and con-
sistent with public safety in the sense that people are punished, but in a manner 
proportionate to their financial situation: for example, a $20 fine for a homeless 
single mother may impose as much pain as a $400 fine for a moneyed person.202 
In theory, lowering the fines and costs for some debtors via a sliding scale 
may seem like it would reduce the amount of money courts would collect. 
However, courts would no longer have to spend money on jail beds for debtors 
who cannot afford to pay existing, uniform fines, and may in fact increase col-
lections from low-income individuals by assessing realistic fines that debtors 
actually can pay. Practically, having any sort of sliding scale would be difficult. 
In Finland, for example, which has sliding scale fines for ticketing and other of-
fenses, police officers can look up income tax returns on the side of the road for 
all residents.203 Things are not as straightforward in the United States, where in-
come information is not readily available to local officials.204 Moreover, calcu-
 199. See, e.g., ArchCity White Paper, supra note 2, at 40-41; DOJ Ferguson Report, supra 
note 3, at 98. 
 200. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.  
 201. See Birckhead, supra note 126, at 23; ArchCity White Paper, supra note 2, at 3; 
Profiting from Probation, supra note 46, at 3. 
 202. See Suzanne Daley, Speeding in Finland Can Cost a Fortune, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 25, 
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/26/world/europe/speeding-in-finland-can 
-cost-a-fortune-if-you-already-have-one.html (stating, in describing Finland’s 
sliding scale system for traffic fines, that “[t]he thinking here is that if it stings for 
the little guy, it should sting for the big guy too”); cf. Bearden, 461 U.S. at 672 
(recognizing that, given a defendant’s diminished financial resources, the State can 
meets its goals of punishment and deterrence through fines tailored to the 
resources of a defendant). 
 203. Daley, supra note 202. 
 204. Id.  
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lating income often is complex, particularly for poor people who often have ir-
regular and shifting employment. 
Community service likely is the alternative measure with the most popular 
appeal, and the most widespread availability under current practice. It requires 
a concrete “payment” from an individual, and while its availability may de-
crease direct collections, in theory localities still benefit by receiving unpaid la-
bor. 
However, expanded access to community service options will not stop 
modern debtors’ prisons by itself. Some courts already frequently offer com-
munity service as an alternative to payment, but still end up jailing hundreds of 
debtors.205 One significant reason for this is that many debtors end up being as-
signed hundreds of hours of community service that they cannot hope to com-
plete.206 Therefore, there must be a reasonable cap on the number of hours that 
can be assigned to one person. 
Other individuals have disabilities, transportation difficulties, or work and 
child care obligations that make it impossible for them to discharge more than a 
small amount of their criminal justice debt through community service.207 
There must be some other option to act as a backstop for poor people who can-
not complete community service. Identifying what this backstop should be is 
one of the greatest theoretical challenges in developing policies that will end 
debtors’ prisons: when debtors cannot comply with alternative measures with-
out substantial hardship, a resolution to those cases that will be perceived as fair 
can be difficult to identify even when a court faithfully considers debtors’ ability 
to pay and offers alternative measures. 
Transforming the framework: community courts. Community courts have 
been put forward by advocates in Ferguson and by the Ferguson Commission 
itself as an avenue of “true municipal court reform,” that would go beyond the 
“remediation of problems, inequities, and inefficiencies” represented by the 
revenue caps and restatement of Bearden incorporated into Missouri state law 
 205. See, e.g., supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text. 
 206. The lead plaintiff in the Austin Complaint, supra note 60, at 6, was ordered to 
perform 395 hours of community service after she was released from jail. Low-
income debtors are assigned so many hours because they owe large debts from fees 
that usually apply only to poor people. These include collection fees, e.g., TEX. 
CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § art. 103.0031(b), payment plan fees, e.g., TEX. GOV. CODE 
§ 102.0212(4); TEX. LOC. GOV. CODE § 133.103, warrants for nonpayment fees, e.g., 
TEX. CODE CRIM. P. 102.011(a)(2), and returned check fees, e.g., Austin Municipal 
Court Rules 5.9(b). In addition, many debtors lose their drivers licenses due to not 
paying tickets, e.g., TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 706.002, which carries an additional 
fee and often results in more tickets for driving without a valid license.  
 207. See, e.g., Dewan, supra note 122 (community service “can be a heavy burden for 
people who work and have family duties”). As a result, judges claim that many 
poor people would rather sit out their debts in jail than do community service. 
Taggart & Campbell, supra note 59. 
126 
 
MarshGerrick FINALPROD.docx (Do Not Delete) 2/28/2016  4:37 PM 
WHY MOTIVE MATTERS  
in the summer of 2015.208 These courts would divert municipal offenders to a 
community justice center where they could access case management and social 
work services, and be considered for alternative punishments including social 
services, group counseling, community restitution, and community service.209 
The revenue impact of community courts is difficult to ascertain without 
more information about who would be eligible to participate. Because most of 
the proposed sanctions in the court are non-monetary, the court could have a 
significant negative revenue impact if it were open to all, including to individu-
als who are able to pay their fines and fees. Limiting access to community courts 
to low-income individuals from whom the municipality is unlikely to collect 
would mitigate or even eliminate the revenue impact, but also would create the 
same personal-responsibility barriers to participation that currently render 
Bearden ineffective. 
Some of the alternative sanctions proposed for a community court, such as 
community service, satisfy public safety and fairness concerns; others, such as 
group therapy, do not look like punishment at all and officials may be unlikely 
to perceive them as having enough of a deterrent effect to protect public safety. 
And while community courts could be very effective at addressing the underly-
ing causes of crime deeply tied to poverty,210 they can be viewed as unfairly 
pathologizing poverty when applied to a public safety crime such as speeding. 
We question whether offenses like speeding require a community treatment re-
sponse or criminal justice supervision just because they are committed by a 
poor person. We also are deeply skeptical of requiring criminal charges as the 
price of access to general anti-poverty support services that may be provided in 
a community court. 
Transforming the framework: civil judgment. Civil judgment, or converting 
criminal justice debt into a civil judgment against the debtor, at which point 
only civil debt enforcement mechanisms may be used and all civil debt protec-
tions will apply, is the last policy reform we consider. This policy was included 
in the recent settlement agreement against the city of Jennings in Missouri.211 
Going forward, if debtors in Jennings do not satisfy their debts within six 
months, the municipal court automatically will convert the debt into a civil 
 208. Karen Tokarz & Steve Stragand, Community Justice Courts Can Be an Innovative 
Reform, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (May 5, 2015), http://www.stltoday.com/news/ 
opinion/community-justice-courts-can-be-an-innovative-reform/article_96a59f74 
-f1cd-5aff-802e-014955831e69.html; see also Ferguson Commission Report, supra note 
93, at 101-02. 
 209. See Tokarz & Stragand, supra note 208. 
 210. Thomas Harvey, Six Months Later: ArchCity Defenders’ Municipal Courts White 
Paper, HARV. J. AFR. AM. PUB. POL’Y (Apr. 26, 2015), http://hjaap.org/six-months 
-later-archcity-defenders-municipal-courts-white-paper/. 
 211. See Jennings Agreed Order, supra note 152, at 3. 
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judgment and “refer the debt to a civil debt collector and take no further action 
in the municipal court.”212 
From a revenue perspective, civil judgments can be helpful because they 
leave the option open for future collections. It also seems fair to treat a debt 
owed to the courts the same as any other debt, and to require all the same legal 
protections that have been established as fair for debt collection by state legisla-
tures. 
However, judges and prosecutors may balk at the civil judgment solution 
because of a belief that poor debtors will not care if they get calls from collectors 
or have bad credit. Criminal justice advocates also may have concerns about the 
fairness of the civil judgment solution. Though debtors would avoid jail, they 
still will be left with debts that are disproportionate to their income and that 
they may never be able to pay off. This could affect their ability to find housing 
and employment for the rest of their lives, while rich people can simply send a 




Revenue generation is undeniably a powerful force behind modern debtors’ 
prisons and a relatively easy-to-grasp explanation for why something as anach-
ronistic as debtors’ prisons still exists. This is especially true in small jurisdic-
tions that rely heavily on court collections, as well as in jurisdictions that em-
ploy private probation companies. 
However, policy makers and advocates must look beyond revenue genera-
tion to effectively combat modern debtors’ prisons nationwide. Revenue gener-
ation does not fully account for the persistence of debtors’ prisons, and in many 
ways the practices that lead to debtors’ prisons are fiscally irrational. Therefore, 
policies that only target the revenue generation motive cannot by themselves 
end debtors’ prisons. 
Because of this, we must take seriously the more traditional rationales—as 
discussed here, public safety, fairness, and personal responsibility—that gov-
ernments use to take punitive action against people who break the law. It is nec-
essary to view possible reforms with an eye to these motives, even though we 
recognize that many of the offenses that land debtors in jail are poverty crimes 
and that in many instances these rationales for punishment may act as a cover 
for racism. 
Courts, law enforcement, and the public will always be concerned about of-
fenses like extreme speeding, and only by fully addressing the concerns that mo-
tivate enforcement of those offenses can we finally put an end to modern debt-
ors’ prisons. 
In order to end debtors’ prisons, we also must develop policy responses that 
look beyond the constitutional protections extended in Bearden, and therefore 
beyond reforms readily achievable in litigation. Those constitutional protec-
tions are limited in significant ways, and by focusing so heavily on personal re-
 212. Id. 
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sponsibility, leave an opening for subjective and biased decision making that 
will continue to feed debtors’ prisons. 
An important way to limit the influence of bias in municipal ticketing and 
collections, while keeping real accountability in the system, is to make alterna-
tive measures for compliance available to all individuals, instead of only to indi-
viduals that judges deem responsible and worthy. However, while we recom-
mend adoption of this approach, we recognize that it is an incomplete response 
to debtors’ prisons because there are limitations and drawbacks to all of the dis-
cussed alternative measures that could be built into such a system. 
Certainly, those alternative measures should include community service, 
but we must grapple with how to provide accountability for individuals who 
can neither pay monetary penalties nor perform community service without 
substantial hardship. That problem will not be easily resolved. Alternative ap-
proaches to accountability for municipal offenses such as community courts 
and converting criminal justice debt into a civil judgment offer possible re-
sponses to this challenge, but risk extending and deepening low-income indi-
vidual’s involvement with a coercive justice system. Additional work to expand 
the menu of alternative measures, with a focus on identifying measures that 
provide accountability without imposing extended justice system involvement 
on low-income individuals who commit minor offenses, is needed to round out 
a comprehensive policy response to modern debtors’ prisons. 
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